Abstract-One main challenge in the practical implementation of a microgrid is the design of an adequate protection scheme in both grid connected and islanded modes. Conventional overcurrent protection schemes face selectivity and sensitivity issues during grid and microgrid faults since the fault current level is different in both cases for the same relay. Various approaches have been implemented in the past to deal with this problem, yet the most promising ones are the implementation of adaptive protection techniques abiding by the IEC 61850 communication standard. This paper presents a critical review of existing adaptive protection schemes, the technical challenges for the use of classical protection techniques and the need for an adaptive, smart protection system. However, the risk of communication link failures and cyber security threats still remain a challenge in implementing a reliable adaptive protection scheme. A contingency is needed where a communication issue prevents the relay from adjusting to a lower current level during islanded mode. An adaptive protection scheme is proposed that utilizes energy storage (ES) and hybrid ES (HESS) already available in the network as a mechanism to source the higher fault current. Four common grid ES and HESS are reviewed for their suitability in feeding the fault while some solutions are proposed.
INTRODUCTION
istributed energy resources (DERs) connected to a microgrid and its integration with the main grid are the targets in achieving optimum operation of electric power system networks [1] . Reducing greenhouse gases generated by the conventional energy resources while increasing the reliability and the power quality for consumers who require uninterruptible power supplies are some of its main advantages. However, along with these benefits, microgrids introduce some major technical challenges in terms of protection schemes. First, dynamic changes in the configuration of the system requires monitoring the status of all distributed generation (DG) while automatically adjusting their relay settings [2] .
The second problem is the introduction of bidirectional power flow. The large penetration of DERs based on an interfaced converter as shown in Fig. 1 will reduce the capacity of the short circuit current when the microgrid is disconnected from the grid (islanded mode) [3] - [4] . Unfortunately, this complication requires dynamic toggling of relay settings whether the relay is in grid connected or islanded mode, an operation which also requires a fast and reliable communication network [5] . Given this need, a question arises of how the microgrid can remain protected even if it encounters a cyberattack rendering the communication link either insecure or severed [6] - [7] . This paper aims to present an analysis of various protection schemes based on an adaptive protection technique that is deployed with communication links between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). Different types of attacks that may impact the communication network is described followed by a discussion over how various energy storage (ES) and hybrid ES (HESS) solutions could be used as a secondary measure in assisting the system to fill the required fault current, even in the event of a communication failure.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II addresses protection issues in a microgrid. Section III reviews existing adaptive protection techniques. Section IV introduces the different types of attacks that could affect the communication network. Section V discusses how ES or HESS could be used to inject the required fault current given a relay remains in grid connected mode and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MAIN PROTECTION CHALLENGES IN MICROGRIDS
There are several challenges that should be taken into consideration in designing a proper protection scheme for a microgrid. The following subsections discuss some of the major issues one may face in the proper operation of a microgrid protection scheme.
A. Selectivity and Sensitivity Issues
Two main characteristics that should be found in microgrid system protection devices are selectivity and sensitivity features. First, selectivity refers to the ability of the protection system to locate and classify a fault correctly.
Overcurrent (OC) relays should determine whether the fault is internal or external to its zone. The protection algorithm should be able to distinguish between the main grid and local microgrid faults [8] - [9] . During main grid faults, the microgrid needs to be capable of islanding to protect equipment in the system [10] - [11] . During microgrid faults, the function of the protection scheme becomes more complicated as it is required to disconnect the smallest part of the faulty section from the system [12] - [13] . It should be noted that the importance of the selectivity feature of the relays is to operate under various faults while isolating the faulty part.
Secondly, sensitivity refers to the fact that OC relays should be able to detect the fault conditions in the system. The fault should be cleared as quickly as possible to maximize safety while minimizing system instability and damage to equipment [14] . The OC relay should quickly arrive at a decision and circuit breakers (CB) must function rapidly [15] . The sensitivity of the relays must be adjusted such that a high redundancy can be achieved without affecting selectivity of the protection system [16] - [18] . 
B. Reducing the Short Circuit Fault Current
The high penetration of DERs based on power electronic inverters interfaced with the microgrid has a great impact on the protection scheme. These systems limit the short circuit current during islanded mode of operation, as they are equipped with a fault limited current (FCL) that prevents high OC levels to flow during the fault period [19] - [21] . A significant difference exists in the amount of short circuit current that occurs when in grid connected and islanded modes of operation. In grid connected, fault currents of a much higher magnitude (5-10 times the full load current) are available to help conventional OC relays to activate under abnormal operations. However, in islanded mode, the fault current reduces to only about 3 times the full load current [12] . Furthermore, a large integration of connected converter-based DERs further reduces the fault current to only 1.2-1.5 times the full load current [22] - [24] . Usually, conventional OC relays are set to operate at 1.2-8 times full load current. Accordingly, the time-current coordination of OC relays and OC devices with extremely inverse characteristics are disturbed.
C. The Direction of Power Flow
Distribution systems become active systems due to the integration of DERs in the system [25] . The microgrid feeds local loads and can also support power to the grid in the case of excess generation. This operation changes the flow of the power from unidirectional to bidirectional. Bi-directional power flow has effects on the amplitude and direction of the fault current thereby effecting coordination of the protective relays [19] , [26] . In this case, the protection system in a typical distribution system is designed accordingly to a time or current coordination principle, in which the relay closest to the fault operates first and in the event of a failure, a backup protective relay operates after a specific delay time (~200 ms).
However, the effectiveness of this protection requires a radial grid connection, which is no longer the case when DGs are connected to the network. This results in either changing or completely losing coordination between protective devices [27] - [28] . The different adverse effects of DG connections on the distribution network protection include false tripping of feeders, blinding of protection, increase or decrease in the fault level with the connection or disconnection of DERs affecting the reach of the OC relay settings [29] - [30] .
D. Dynamic Changes in the Microgrid Architecture
Dynamic changes of the microgrid configuration should be taken into consideration when designing the protection scheme. Some changes include the disconnection of generation units, shutting down some loads during peak hours, or exporting of power to the main grid during excess generation periods for optimum and economic operations [25] . Adaptive protection is required to change the relay settings according to the current microgrid configuration. Prior knowledge of every state in the microgrid as well as online monitoring and calculation of the short circuit fault current is needed for proper operation. As previously discussed, this requires the application of a fast, reliable, and robust communication system [31] .
III. EXISTING TECHNIQUES FOR ADAPTIVE PROTECTION
Adaptive protection refers to an online process which modifies the preferred protective responses and correlates them to a change in system conditions or requirements in a timely manner through control or signaling [8] . Adaptive protection consists of a smart control unit that monitors the grid parameters including a smart fault diagnostic system to detect the fault, the fault type, identify the faulted zone, and a smart relaying system which protects the system against faults. Adaptive protection of the microgrid can be realized with the use of microprocessor-based directional OC relays (DOCR). DOCR have the possibility to choose different tripping curves to suit a particular system. An adaptive protection scheme can
The decentralized control architecture depends on sending and receiving data between IEDs. Each IED can change its settings according to the data that it receives from other IEDs. Presently, the industry is focused on the IEC 61850 standard as the protocol for decentralized communication [34] - [35] . The microgrid protection scheme requires an adaptive, smart, and upgradable protection algorithm. A survey of existing key adaptive protection schemes are presented in this section.
In [16] , a novel adaptive protection technique is proposed using extensive communication and digital relays. Settings of the relays are changed according to the microgrid configuration. The technique is further extended by using numerical directional relays with a directional interlock capability for selective operation. Additional adaptive protection schemes were introduced in [36] - [37] with advanced communication technologies for updating the relay settings in accordance with the microgrid configuration. The authors proposed a central protection unit to be equipped with the microgrid to change the tripping characteristics of the relays with every interruption call for the connection and disconnection of DGs. Reference [17] studied the fault current of an inverter-based microgrid and proposed an adaptive protection algorithm for the fault current. This technique depended on comparing the impedance of the grid and microgrid using the voltage and current fault components in a real time manner. In this way, the relay updated its settings by observing the changing impedance of the utility and microgrid. Refrence [28] suggested a system with a high penetration of DGs that loosened the coordination of the protective relays due to bidirectional power flow in the system. A centralized control center communicated online with modern CBs in the system to send a trip signal under the fault condition. Fault contribution from the sources was obtained online through a Thevenin equivalent impedance. Under abnormal conditions, a change in the Thevenin impedance of the adjoining fault bus source was detected. Thus, the relay determined the fault and tripped the appropriate CBs. In [38] , the authors used numerical relays to detect the fault current under grid connected and islanded modes. Different trip characteristics settings were calculated in both modes and saved in the relays. When the microgrid switched into islanded mode, the relay automatically changed a group of settings that matched this mode.
Previously in [4] , a supercapacitor with a DC-DC converter was added to each DER with the same rated power that would add to the cost of the protection system, especially given supercapacitors were not originally used during normal operation. In [23] , a technique is presented to protect the microgrid based on a voltage measurement of the fault detection modules, but it may not be accurate to determine the faulty part of the system and may also require time. This would have direct impacts on selective protection of the microgrid. Reference [39] introduces communication failures as a critical issue which is now being widely presented in literature. The operation of the relay depends on the voltage drop during the fault that may require many loads to disconnect from the system. Finally, in [40] different techniques that could be used to protect the microgrid are reviewed. In [40] , a direction relation to our work is identified as it highlights the importance of communication in protection schemes which cannot be carried out in a cyberattack and identifies the need for another solution.
IV.
CYBER PHYSICAL ATTACKS Security attacks in microgrid communication networks are intended to interrupt messages that are exchanged between IEDs. The attacks can be implemented using common network security attacks or by exploiting a Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Value (SV) messages as shown in Fig. 2 .
A. Network Security Attacks
This attack is performed through the communication network to damage, change, or access user data without permission [41] . The following are several types of network security attacks:
1) Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) is the process of preventing the authorized user of a service to access that service [41] . Main types of DoS that may affect the communication between protective devices include SYN (synchronization) floods and buffer overflow. For the first type, the attacker sends a continuously spoofed SYN request to the target IED to distort the connection between the authorized user and IEDs [42] . This type of attack can be orchestrated by running several protocol services like FTP, HTTP and Telnet on the IED at the same time [43] - [44] . For the second type, the attacker may transmit malicious code to an IED and write oversized data to cause a buffer overflow. This attack is possible as a result of the vulnerability of IEDs and the unavailability of security measures for IEDs to detect the malicious code [42] .
2) Password Cracking Attempts
This type of attack is defined as an attempt to gain access to an IED, another device, or a system by guessing the password [45] . Attackers who are able to access an IED can send a false tripping signal to the CB that can cause it to disconnect a healthy part in the system. This can be accomplished in two ways: a brute force attack and a dictionary attack. A brute force is performed by arranging all possible combinations of passwords and trying these combinations one-by-one to achieve the correct password but can take a long time. In a dictionary attack, the password is simply guessed. This type may take less time than the latter. In [43] and [44] , hackers were able to utilize FTP, HTTP and Telnet services already running on the IED to crack the password. 
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3) Eavesdropping Attacks Eavesdropping attack is an attempt to steal packets that are being transmitted through the system. This type of attack is launched from within the Local Area Network (LAN) and can target FTP, HTTP and Telnet services because messages for these protocols are not encrypted [43] . There are three types of this attack. The first is known as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning. ARP is a communication protocol that converts an IP address into incorrect MAC address (i.e. the MAC address of the attacker), the switch will end up forwarding all packets addressed to the attacker and enables the attacker to capture those packets. The second type is to cause Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table flooding. This is done by filling in the CAM table of the switch with fake entries. When it is full, packets addressed to a MAC address that are not in the CAM table will be broadcasted to the whole network allowing attackers to capture them. Finally, the third type is switch port stealing where fake frames are sent to the switch that contain the target host MAC address causing the switch to modify the CAM table. This allows the MAC address to connect to the interface that leads to the attacker [46] .
B. Attacks on GOOSE and SV Messages
There are two multicast message protocols used in IEC 61850 which include GOOSE and SMV messages. The main function of the GOOSE message is to send a trip signal to the CB to isolate the faulty part from the system. SV messages are used to send voltage and current values from merging units to the protective devices. Both messages use a switched Ethernet network for communication purposes. These messages must be transmitted within 4 ms. The following section discusses several attacks that exploit GOOSE and SMV messages.
1) GOOSE and SV Modification Attacks
In this type, the attacker changes the message that is exchanged between the protective devices without allowing the publisher (the sender of GOOSE messages) or subscriber (the receiver of GOOSE messages) to notice. Two types can be found in this attack. For the first type, the attacker captures the GOOSE message and modifies it with another message that enables the attacker to control a CB. For a SV packet, an attacker sends a fabricated analog value to a control center in the system that leads to gain control of IEDs and cause a power outage [46] . The second type of attack is performed using a malware script [45] . The malware can capture the message that is exchanged between IEDs altering and re-injecting GOOSE message packets into the IEC 61850 network. In order to enable the malware to perform its job, it must be installed on a computer inside the network. Attackers exploit the weakness in GOOSE where encryption and digital signatures cannot be applied due an IEC 61850 requirement that any operation which is communicated using a GOOSE message must take effect within 4 ms. Without encryption and digital signatures, a transmitted packet can be easily captured, modified, and retransmitted into the network.
2) GOOSE and SV Denial of Service Attacks
These attacks prevent IEDs to respond to legitimate messages made by other IEDs. This can be done by sending a large number of messages to the target IED, where it becomes overwhelmed and is unable to respond to a legitimate request. GOOSE poisoning attacks are another way to perform DoS as shown in Fig. 3 . The aim of these attacks is to get the subscriber to accept GOOSE messages with a higher sequence number than those sent by the publisher. As a result, all GOOSE messages from the publisher will be considered invalid by the subscribers leaving the subscribers to only accept GOOSE messages from the attacker. There are three variables of GOOSE poisoning attacks including high status number attacks, high rate flooding attacks, and semantic attacks. For the high status number attack, the attacker sends a single spoofed GOOSE frame with a very high status number to a GOOSE subscriber by the attacker. Secondly, in a high rate flooding attack, the attacker multicasts a range of spoofed GOOSE messages with higher status numbers. The spoofed GOOSE frames employ a status number higher than the expected status number of a GOOSE subscriber. In a semantic attack, the attacker will fix the status number in the GOOSE message and determine the rate of status change. Then, the attacker will spoof GOOSE messages that are higher than the detected rate of status change [47] .
3) GOOSE and SV Replay Attacks
In this attack, GOOSE messages are captured and kept by the attacker. Then, the attacker sends a message to trip the CB under normal operation which may result in an undesirable action. For a SV message replay attack, the attacker can also capture a SV packet containing certain values of power and current and send it to another protective device in the substation several times. SV packets with the same power and voltage values circulating inside the system can lead to an unplanned outage [48] .
V. ENERGY STORAGE AS A CONTINGENCY
The previous section revealed many communication vulnerabilities which can be exploited by hackers. However, clearly not all communication outages are related to cyberattacks. The loss of adequate communication to a relay can be catastrophic to a microgrid protection scheme where the most difficult aspect is handling a dramatically increased fault current magnitude when moving from islanded to grid connected mode. In the event of a cyber-physical attack or loss of communication, a protection scheme would be paralyzed where relays will no longer be capable in adjusting OC limits. Assuming a cyber-physical attack or communication loss has taken place, relays will now require 5-10 times the full load current to trip in islanded mode. In this case, ES devices already present in the system for other purposes could now also be tasked in assisting to increase the fault current magnitude. In this section, four types of common grid ES devices are reviewed, compared, and discussed for their suitability to inject the required fault current. It is assumed that the microgrid under study already has one or multiple ES devices connected to the network, hence no cost would be added to the system. Thus, their participation in supporting the required fault current would be classified as another capability. Next, the concept of a HESS is presented as well as some examples of their usage in grid applications. Following a review, some potential single ES and HESS solutions are discussed as well as considerations and trade-offs in deploying them.
A. Common Grid Energy Storage Types
The following subsections will review the operation of four common grid ES types devices: Lead Acid (LA) batteries, Lithium Ion (LI) batteries, Supercapacitors (SC), and Flywheel (FW) ES. Table I depicts a comparison of each ES type as well as the categories considered. The operation of each type, their strengths and weaknesses, and examples of previous grid applications are discussed.
1) Lead Acid Batteries
The LA battery has maintained a strong hold in the market as a result of its simplicity in design and inexpensive materials [49] . Despite the fact that emerging electric vehicles (EV) have moved onto LI types, the LA market remains strong as it is still the most common starter battery and battery in uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) [50] . Furthermore, some of the drawbacks in deploying them in EVs are relieved when placing them in a stationary grid application. While real estate may still remain a premium, concerns with weight can be alleviated. The LA battery has been demonstrated as a dependable resource in stationary grid applications to smoothen the energy harvested by renewables, but has been more universally accepted in restoring system frequency and voltage following an outage [51] - [53] . Despite its strengths in reliability and low cost, LA has a relatively low energy and power density and suffers from a number of drawbacks. LA are not ideal in sourcing high frequency pulsed loads as a result of its large double layer capacitance, a weakness which would also reduce their suitability to solely supply a fault current [54] .
Its operation utilizes a sulfuric acid electrolyte as a fuel primarily governed by changes in the concentration, an inefficient process which leads to a number of lifespan concerns. First, their operational current is severely limited, as an increase from a conservative 20-hour discharge rate (C/20) would result in reduced usable capacity and increased ageing. Ergo, in order to fill a fault current, the size of the LA array should be very large to limit the peak array current. Finally, their shelf and cycle life are highly limited.
2) Lithium Ion Batteries
LI battery usage has surged in recent years not only in portable electronics, but also in large scale EVs and even grid storage [55] . Advanced LI battery management systems have been demonstrated in microgrid applications for both islanded and grid-connected modes to provide voltage and frequency support [56] - [57] . Since LI battery management is more complex than that of the LA, studies have looked at the best method to control these schemes [58] - [59] .
Operation is significantly different from that of LA, where energy is stored inside its electrodes utilizing the electrolyte as simply a transfer layer [60] . This combined with a smaller cell construction allow them to respond faster to a pulsed load which in turn, would also make them suitable in feeding a fault current. LI batteries offer a significant improvement in their capability to source high current without the same trade-offs in lifespan as seen with the LA battery. Their lifespans are much longer, but similar to the LA battery, are still limited by excessive operational currents and particularly temperature [61] . Battery management system cost for LI batteries is increased as a result of required crucial cell balancing and thermal control for safety. Finally, a number of companies have been working to reduce the cost of grid-scale LI battery arrays as their cost is still at a premium as compared to LA.
3) Supercapacitors
The SC provides a significant increase in the speed of response versus any electrochemical battery. Although their construction is chemical in nature, no reaction takes place. This enables them to respond extremely fast to a demand while even under heavy current, their lifetime is virtually unaffected [62] . Composed of two porous electrodes divided by a separator soaked in a solvent electrolyte, their construction enables a much higher charge density versus the traditional capacitor as a result of an increased surface area [63] . Their usage has been studied in mobile shipboard applications where weight is a concern, but also in some grid applications with multiple renewable energy resources where they provide short term storage to supply the deficiency power [64] - [65] . Unfortunately, their low energy density can require an enormous capacitance which may not prove to be practical as a sole ES device. Although their response time in feeding the required power would be superb, sourcing the total energy required to fill a fault current would come at a massive cost [66] . Its energy density is only around 10% of that of the LA battery and 2% of a LI battery and their self-discharge rate is relatively high. Furthermore, of all ES included in this survey, they have the highest cost.
4) Flywheel Energy Storage
Like the LA battery, FW ES has been synonymous with industrial UPS systems, but for a very different purpose. FW ES provides some of the highest power density in our study and are primarily purposed to support to pulsed loads which would initially make them appear to be a great candidate to inject a 
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fault current [67] . Analogous to an electromechanical battery, the FW stores kinetic energy in a high inertia rotating mass where an electric machine operates simultaneously as a motor during charging and generator during discharging. The power output is a function of a square of the speed allowing them to provide extremely high power density. This has made them an excellent solution for maintaining power quality [68] - [69] . They have also been tested for their usage in both wind and solar applications as a mechanism to quickly store and expend energy [70] . FW also carry a unique capability unlike other ES: the ability to supply inertia to the system [71] . Unfortunately, the FW has a very high self-discharge rate as a result of friction losses and like the SC, a very low energy density [72] . Although their cost is half that of the SC, their response time is still very fast, limited only by the initial inertia required to start moving the rotating mass. However, their energy density is very low, some 20% below the SC which would further reduce their capability in solely injecting the fault current.
5) Hybrid Energy Storage Systems
Although some ES devices such as the LI or LA battery can provide a rather balanced contribution of energy versus power density, cost and lifetime aspects could jeopardize their sole integration with the grid. Similarly, the integration of a SC or FW alone could provide excellent voltage and frequency support for a small outage, but would fail to fill energy demands over longer periods without a huge system. For this reason, HESS could provide a more balanced solution in terms of not only power and energy density, but also cost, lifespan, and selfdischarge. HESS have emerged in an effort to utilize the strengths of multiple ES devices in a way that is not only more efficient, but potentially cost and lifetime effective. Recent HESS for microgrid applications have focused on the collaboration of batteries with SCs, evaluating their combination with both LA and LI [73] - [74] . Minimizing losses while ensuring an optimum power split between the two sources has spawned research in this topic [75] . A great deal of work has focused specifically on pulsed load management through the deployment of HESS systems [76] - [77] . A pulsed load typically contains a very high power demand over a relatively short period of time. Unfortunately, reaching the required level of power and filling the energy demand over such a short period of time can be challenging. Examples can be found in a number of Naval weapons platforms, the starter current for a vehicle, and the case addressed in this paper: a fault current.
B. Potential Solutions to Source the Fault Current
As previously discussed, each ES device has its own respective strengths and weaknesses and few would be suitable to solely source a fault current. A general example of a fault current is shown in Fig. 4 , where a high in-rush current is needed for approximately 80 ms to reach the requiring between 5 and 10 times the base load current I . A multitude of solutions could assist in injecting the required fault current, however, they are limited by both the available infrastructure as well as the proximity of each ES device from the CB. In the following subsections, 2 scenarios are presented representing microgrids which already have a single ES element or the availability of all sources in Table I on the network located a reasonable distance from the location of the CB.
1) Single Source Solutions
For a microgrid with only one type of ES, tasking it to assist in feeding the fault is more complicated. First, a system which only contains a SC or FW could require a very large and expensive infrastructure to be feasible. The two most suitable devices in this case are the LI and LA batteries, as they provide the greatest balance. The LA battery has a much lower cost, but its response time is much slower than that of the LI battery which could prolong the fault period resulting in equipment or infrastructure damage. Furthermore, a large array would be needed or an excessive current magnitude would damage the batteries over time. The LI battery has the best response time of the 2 battery types and would require a smaller array as a result of being able to operate at higher current. Despite a higher cost, LI batteries already present in the system would be the most feasible sole source for the fault current.
2) Availability of all Energy Storage Devices
In the event that all resources in Table I are available on the network, a combination of the strengths from all ES devices could be used to feed the fault current in a dynamically switched SC-FW-LI-LA HESS. Fig. 4 breaks down the initial concept which involves contribution from each ES to the surge pulse broken into 4 switching steps. An ES type is first connected at the start of the fault ( ), where each of the remaining 3 devices are sequentially added in parallel until the final required fault current level has been reached at tripping the breaker ( ). The proposed sequence begins with the deployment of the SC at as it responds quickest to the demand initially injecting high power until reaching , where the FW assists in increasing the power even faster to get within the range of the fault current level while concurrently contributing inertia to the system. Since the SC and FW have low susceptibility to lifespan issues, the selection of would primarily rely upon the availability of each to provide the energy to reach . Since the energy stored in both is relatively small, the LI battery would be added at to assist in maintaining the energy required to fill the pulse. Since the LI battery provides a good balance of both power and energy, it can assist in feeding the required energy while simultaneously increasing the power until the LA battery is added at to reach the fault current level. A trade-off can once again be made between the availability of LA and LI capacities, but now involving lifespan as well. The cost of LI array may force the operator to require more support from LA, shifting the location of . However, the severe consequences in overusing LA should be considered as their lifespans would take the highest toll. 
